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Abstract: In modern economics, the institutions surrounding the creation and 
development of new technologies are firms, markets and governments. We propose 
an alternative theory that locates the institutional origin of new technologies further 
back in the commons when self-organizing groups of technology enthusiasts 
develop effective governance rules to pool distributed information resources. 
The ‘innovation commons’ alleviates uncertainty around a nascent technology 
by pooling distributed information about uses, costs, problems and opportunities. 
While innovation commons are mostly temporary, because the resource itself – 
the information about opportunities – is only temporarily valuable, they are a 
further addition to the Pantheon of commons, and suggest that the institutions of 
the commons – and the common pool resource of information about applications 
of the technology – may be far more important in the study of innovation than 
previously thought.
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1. The commons at the origin of a new technology
The first generation of commons was in the real world of shared physical natural 
resources such as fisheries, grazing pastures and forests that extended to artificial 
resources such as irrigation systems (Ostrom 1990). But a second generation of 
commons studies has developed the field ever towards intangible common pool 
resources of information and knowledge, such as science (Boyle 2007; Schweik 
and English 2012) and culture (Ostrom and Hess 2007; Frischmann et al. 2014). 
These days, most new commons are the intangible sort, and are on a larger, more 
global scale (Ostrom et al. 2002; Hess 2008; Stern 2011; Epstein et al. 2014). 
Research on knowledge commons have focused on a wide variety of topics and 
resources, including: open source software (Schweik 2007, 2014); roller derby’s 
(Fagundes 2014); the airplane industry (Meyer 2014); and genetic information 
and research (Lucchi 2013; Contreras 2014). This shift, however, has required 
commons scholars to devise new methods and refine previous concepts about 
what constitutes a common pool resource and common property regime (Poteete 
et al. 2010). Analysing commons based on ‘ideas’ rather than commons of ‘things’ 
is more difficult for two reasons: first it is sometimes difficult to understand what 
the resource is because such resources are often substantially more intangible 
and dynamic; and second because there is a further actor within a knowledge 
commons who produces the resource (Madison et al. 2010; Cole 2014). In this 
paper, we introduce a new type of commons – an innovation commons – that exists 
at the very beginning of a new technology, at the point when a group of people, 
often technology enthusiasts, come together in order to discover opportunities 
for the use and development of the technology. But this is not a technology 
commons. It is an innovation commons because the common pool resource is not 
the technology per se, but information and knowledge about the technology that 
subsequently facilitates its development, where by other users or stakeholders, 
including entrepreneurs, for whom uncertainty has been sufficiently reduced that 
they are able to confidently act. We suggest this constitutes a third generation of 
commons, a higher order form of information and knowledge about information 
and knowledge. 
There are two substantial contributions we seek to make in identifying and 
elaborating this new class of commons. First, we introduce the fundamental 
importance of the commons into innovation economics. Innovation economics, 
as we will show, has systematically neglected the institutions of the commons by 
the very definition of the innovation problem as one of market failure (resolved 
with government) rather than as a collective action problem (resolved with gover-
nance). Our second contribution goes in the other direction, by developing a study 
of a new and somewhat exotic species of commons that emerges spontaneously at 
the origin of a new technology. Such a commons arrangement is efficient in coor-
dinating knowledge because uncertainty makes other institutional forms – such as 
firms and markets – comparatively costly (in a transactions cost sense). It follows 
that innovation commons tends to collapse once the uncertainty surrounding an 
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opportunity has resolved. We further argue that the pattern by which a technology 
evolves into society – and whether it becomes a private good, or a public good – is 
substantially shaped by its early pathway through the commons.
The first institution that forms about any new technology, we argue, is 
not usually a firm or a market, but rather a commons – hence, an innovation 
commons. However, this is not the standard model in innovation economics 
in which the founding institutions are centred on path-breaking public 
research, government-granted intellectual property, and innovating firms led 
by bold creative entrepreneurs, and supported by venture finance. Often, those 
individual and commercial phases are actually not what the early stages of a 
new technology looks like. In contrast, the early stages of new technologies are 
often characterised by the grouping actions of a community of mostly amateur 
enthusiasts. Those enthusiasts pool and share information – that is, create a 
common pool of information – in order to discover the outlines of a potentially 
valuable opportunity. That opportunity need not be in the form of a start-up 
firm or a sellable property right, it is simply something new. Institutionally 
considered, the cooperative commons forms before the subsequent emergence 
of competitive firms and markets, and indeed, the very possibility of firms and 
markets will often emerge from discoveries made in the commons. The lone 
genius of technological innovation is an almost entirely mythological creature. 
The development of a technology – from nascent idea to widespread use – is 
fundamentally a collective process (Allen 1983) because in the beginning of a 
new technology uncertainty is extremely high and different people will know 
different things. Different people have different information about the potential 
uses, costs, possibilities and opportunities of that technology. We suggest that a 
commons can often be a highly efficient institution for gathering and combining 
such information in order to create a valuable common pool resource.
The key resource in an innovation commons is not the technology itself, but 
the distributed, partial and heterogeneous information that surrounds it. Much 
of this information is experimentally acquired, often tacit and of little value 
by itself, but of high value when combined with other information that reveals 
how the technology might be applied, and by whom, to do what, in combination 
with what, and so on. This is the information that distinguishes invention from 
innovation (Schumpeter 1934). From the steam engine, to electricity, to the 
internet, it takes time to discover socially and economically valuable uses for 
technologies. Coordinating institutions are necessary to gather and make sense of 
the information about costs and problems. Institutions of hierarchy (whether firms 
or governments) or the institutions of the market (property rights, price signals) 
are often poor at dealing with this combination of a highly distributed, tacit and 
uncertain resource. Therefore our claim is not that all innovative discoveries 
will occur in the commons. Rather, the institutions associated with the common 
property regimes – for instance, flat hierarchies and dynamic structures – may be 
comparatively efficient processing mechanisms, especially in the early stages of 
a new technology.
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The innovation commons are a species of cultural and knowledge commons 
because they are, at their core, a pool of knowledge (Ostrom and Hess 2007; 
Madison et al. 2010; Frischmann et al. 2014). An innovation commons faces 
similar free rider problems to knowledge commons, and opportunism is an ever-
present problem. Innovation commons need to develop rules to screen participants 
and to punish both free-riders and opportunists.1 A common property regime with 
some form of exclusion is often necessary to maintain a balance between these 
dual concerns. 
Unlike natural resource commons or other new commons, which can be long-
lived and stable, a peculiar but characteristic feature of innovation commons is 
that they tend to be a transient institution. An innovation commons will coalesce 
around a new technology and then later collapse when its purpose disappears. 
Perhaps this is why the innovation commons around new technologies have 
remained undiscovered until now. The reason an innovation commons emerges is 
because of its relative efficiency as a governance structure for sharing and pool-
ing distributed knowledge for opportunity discovery. Because early stage innova-
tion is an environment where you don’t quite know what you’re producing, or 
how you’re going to do it, or who you’re going to do it with, a flexible and flat 
governance structure is amenable to opportunity discovery. But the very thing a 
successful innovation commons does – pooling distributed information to over-
come uncertainty about the prospects of a new technology – provides the con-
ditions for other institutions to outcompete it (as uncertainty falls). Alternative 
institutions – for instance, entrepreneurial firms and governments – who rely on 
reduced uncertainty and stable expectations in order to make plans and invest-
ments over property, gain a foothold. An innovation commons will often collapse 
at this point, replaced by institutions that render the technology as distinctly pri-
vate or public good.
Why does this matter? On one hand, this is just another extension of the 
science of the commons into a new space where it was previously not thought 
relevant (viz. Ostrom 1990). But this extension is of significance, and perhaps 
contentiousness, because we claim to have discovered a new class of commons 
at the locus of what economic theory reliably informs us is the single most 
important factor determining the wealth and prosperity of nations: the growth 
of new technologies (Solow 1956; Romer 1990). Since Richard Nelson (1959) 
and Ken Arrow (1962) (see Stephan 1996; Martin and Scott 2000; Bleda and Del 
Rio 2013) economists have claimed the existence of market failure at the point 
of investment in developing new technologies. In consequence, large-scale and 
global suites of government policy – ranging from intellectual property, through 
R&D tax credits, to targeted procurement, through publically funded research, 
high technology industry policy, including especially military spending, and a raft 
1
 The purpose of the current paper is not to discuss the specific mechanisms by which an innovation 
commons overcomes such problems. Rather, our purpose is to focus on the underlying resources and 
potential characteristics of an innovation commons.
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of other programs amounting to typically around 3 or 4% of GDP in each nation, 
adding to several trillions of US dollars worldwide – address this market failure.
The innovation commons hypothesis suggests that we might have overlooked 
the role of the commons in this innovation process. As such, analysis of the inno-
vation commons may simultaneously extend and enrich commons theory, and 
inform the application of innovation policy. 
2. The innovation problem: beyond firms and states
The contemporary status of innovation economics, and with it innovation policy, 
looks remarkably like the state of commons research prior to Elinor Ostrom’s 
(1990) systematic rebuttal of Garrett Hardin’s (1968) pessimism about the 
‘tragedy of the commons’. While the specific problem differs – from under-
produced innovation resources to over-exploited natural resources – the underlying 
diagnosis and treatment is the same. Both stories – of innovation and of a common 
pool resource – began with a supposed market failure that was resolved along a 
dichotomy of solutions amounting to privatisation on one hand, or state regulation 
and ownership on the other. Ostrom taught us how to analyse and understand 
the ability of civil society to overcome such social dilemmas, and that not only 
is there a third option beyond Coasian property rights solutions or Pigouvian 
government interventions but that the third option – the commons – is under 
certain circumstances the most efficient or first-best institutional possibility. We 
seek to elaborate how that same argument also applies to innovation economics – 
to ‘the innovation problem’ – which has not yet had its ‘Ostrom moment’ and still 
occupies an institutional universe of firms, markets and states. 
The ‘innovation problem’ as an economic problem was first clearly defined by 
Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) who diagnosed new (scientific) knowledge as 
a public good, and therefore subject to market failure when privately produced. 
The implication of this particular framing was that new knowledge either had 
to be enclosed within private property (e.g. with strong intellectual property) or 
broadly recognised as the responsibility of government to produce (e.g. large 
scale public science). By construction, there was no prospect of a community-
level governance solution because the innovation problem was never recognised 
as a collective action problem in the first place. Public (government) or private 
(markets) were, along with various hybrids such as R&D investment subsidies 
and industry policy, the fundamental forms of the public-policy solutions to the 
innovation problem under the market failure diagnosis. What is striking is the 
complete oversight of community level governance models – including common 
property regimes – as possible institutional solutions to the innovation problem.
We can easily unpack the microeconomics of the innovation problem to 
show that there is nothing in the logic of the problem that excludes institutional 
meso-level (i.e. network-level, community-level, industry-level) solutions in 
the commons. The innovation problem is fundamentally one of misaligned 
microeconomic incentives in a group activity. Because of the fixed costs and 
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uncertainty associated with discovery, as well as the public goods characteristics 
of knowledge, individuals may worry about opportunism and exploitation in their 
private investment of resources to innovative activities (Arrow 1962). From a 
social welfare perspective, investment in producing new knowledge that has fixed 
costs and is appropriable suffers a market failure because the marginal cost will 
always be below the average cost, and whoever accrues those fixed costs will be 
outcompeted by new entrants (Jones and Williams 1998; Bleda and Del Rio 2013). 
A frictionless competitive market will dedicate too few resources to innovation 
than is socially desirable (Romano 1989). This is the innovation problem, 
conventionally defined: innovation is incompatible with perfect competition. 
With that diagnosis, the problem is perfect competition. The different ways of 
removing innovation from perfect competition constitute the modern systems of 
innovation policy (Nelson 1993; Freeman 1995; Soete et al. 2010; Dodgson et al. 
2011). Governments impose innovation policy through two broad categories: 
market-based interventions or planning-based interventions (Bleda and Del Rio 
2013). Intellectual property statutes create monopoly rights over innovations 
(Boldrin and Levine 2008). This Coasian solution attaches property rights so that 
innovation may be bargained to equilibrium (Coase 1960). States also create and 
direct non-market organisations, such as public science institutes. Between these 
extremes of market and state institutions are hybrid mechanisms operating through 
both markets and planners, such as R&D tax credits, which are fundamentally 
Pigouvian subsidies. Innovation policies are institutions with different costs and 
benefits at different margins (Goolsbee 1998; Davidson and Potts 2016). 
These different forms of innovation policy contribute institutional diversity 
to the overall innovation system. Given the levels of uncertainty associated with 
different new technologies, this perspective is certainly in line with modern new 
institutional approaches (Ostrom 2005). It is also not out of place to recognise 
there are no panaceas when it comes to the institutions of innovation policy, even 
given the widespread presumption that underwrites innovation policy around the 
world that the state will succeed where the market was assumed to fail (Davidson 
and Spong 2010; Lindsay and Dougan 2013). 
The more striking point to note is what is missing from the modern diagnosis 
of the innovation problem. Without any damage done to its underlying assump-
tions about fixed costs of investment, the innovation problem can be recognised 
as equivalently a collective action problem. The hidden assumption is the one that 
takes the new idea immediately to the realms of a global public good – and there-
fore within the province of government action – without recognising that the inno-
vation problem begins as a local public goods problem well before it ever gets to 
the stage of a global public good. As a collective action problem, the innovation 
problem can be re-diagnosed as one in which a community of interest – nominally 
the enthusiasts for the new technology – need to develop institutional rules of gov-
ernance to enable them to effectively pool and contribute innovation resources. 
Intervention-based innovation policies centred squarely on market failure 
ignore the possibility that individuals can collectively govern themselves. Just 
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as Ostrom (1990) claimed privatisation and government-control solutions are 
‘too sweeping in their claims’, so too we argue for the governance of innovation 
resources. Just as the tragedy of the commons was a misdiagnosis for natural 
resources, innovation policy may have been misdiagnosed. We need to move 
beyond markets and states in the governance of innovation resources. Innovation 
economics – and in its application, policy – must move beyond the narrow market 
failure argument in innovation – which only renders solutions through markets 
and states – towards viewing innovation as a collective action problem over the 
coordination of innovation resource.
3. Entrepreneurial opportunities and innovation resources
To appreciate the significance of the innovation commons to a modern economy 
and society, we start by appreciating the role of the entrepreneur and the 
fundamental difficulty the entrepreneur faces. The entrepreneur is the economic 
driver of change – the agent who introduces novelty and newness to economic 
life (Schumpeter 1934, 1942).2 The Schumpeterian approach focused on the 
role of dispersed knowledge, uncertainty and institutions for coordinating this 
knowledge into a new economic order. The entrepreneur, in this view, is an agent 
who acts in an environment of uncertainty, exhibits judgement, alertness or skill 
in making those decisions, and coordinates or allocates scarce resources based on 
those judgements (Lachmann 1976; Kirzner 1978; Casson 1982; Shackle 1992; 
Earl 2003; Foss and Klein 2012).
The fundamental problem entrepreneurs face is uncertainty.3 Entrepreneurship 
means making decisions over events with few, perhaps no, similar past events on 
which to base expectations, yet creating or identifying new ends and means rela-
tionships that were previously undetected or underutilized (Gaglio and Katz 2001; 
Eckhardt and Shane 2003).4 Entrepreneurs face ill-structured problems of search 
and discovery of market opportunities (Dosi 1988), and consequently those who 
correctly identify the value of innovation resources and other market factors will 
be rewarded with profit (Kirzner 1978). Indeed, when framed this way, this prob-
lem applies to any group engaged in an innovative process, whether for profit or 
otherwise. 
The inputs into the entrepreneurial process – innovation resources – are 
any resources that entrepreneurs acquire to deal with this uncertainty in order 
2
 Note that entrepreneur refers not only to profit-seeking entrepreneurs in private markets, but also 
to social, cultural and political entrepreneurship, as a general statement about the agent who seeks to 
develop a new idea (Baumol 1990).
3
 Following Knight (1921), uncertainty is about unique events over which outcomes are not only 
unknown, but are fundamentally unknowable (Shackle 1992).
4
 Uncertainty is a two-sided coin for the entrepreneur – both the problem they must overcome and 
their source of profit. With perfect knowledge and foresight there would be no entrepreneurial profit, 
as all market opportunities would be costlessly and instantaneously exploited (Knight 1921; Rumelt 
2005).
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to discover market opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman 2000). This is not 
limited to money (i.e. financial investments). The most valuable resources for 
the entrepreneur are knowledge about market opportunities. This is because no 
entrepreneur can access or process, within any reasonable time frame or cost, 
the complete set of information needed to perfectly assess a market opportunity 
in respect of how a technology works in particular circumstances. This bounded 
rationality constraint extends to regulatory barriers and political uncertainty they 
may face; the way consumers use the technology in differing circumstances; the 
price points of competing technologies; the forward marginal costs and revenues 
of production; the sourcing of physical resources for production; the prospect 
of potential investment including venture capital; the problems that may arise 
when scaling up; the sources of expertise which they may seek and purchase; and 
so on. Obviously they would seek to gather that information, and its possession 
would be exactly as valuable as the opportunity it represents. Yet for the most 
part, this information is inherently unknowable ex ante, hidden within a cloud of 
uncertainty. 
Entrepreneurs may improve their situation, and reduce uncertainty, by 
accessing information held by others. While no one person may have all that 
information, many people might – the information sufficient to describe the 
opportunity is distributed (Shane 2000). Just as different entrepreneurs will 
discover different opportunities because they possess different prior knowledge 
(Venkataraman 1997), entrepreneurial agents may seek to reciprocally pool 
their knowledge in the hope of mutually discovering a market opportunity. As 
the pieces of knowledge that describe a market opportunity are distributed over 
many agents in an economy there is an important possibility for the entrepreneur: 
coordinating this information through institutions. Several characteristics of 
entrepreneurial information, however, make institutional coordination difficult. 
Knowledge about market opportunities is generally only acquired by experiment 
and experience – through trial and error experimentation. This is because the 
value of such knowledge only emerges when assembled and combined with other 
complementary resources. The value of the overall entrepreneurial opportunity 
remains unclear before all of the parts are coherently synthesised. Entrepreneurial 
information exhibits heterogeneous value. This is why many entrepreneurial 
theories focus on judgement, or synthesis, or making connections. So what 
institutional governance structures are best to coordinate dispersed entrepreneurial 
information: is it markets, firms, governments, or the commons?
In established markets prices do much of this coordinating work, as Hayek 
(1945, 526) explained: “… in a system where the knowledge of the relevant 
facts is dispersed among many people, prices can act to coordinate the separate 
actions of different people in the same way as a subjective values help the 
individual to coordinate the parts of his plan.” However, in new markets – where 
the structure of the future industry is unclear and uncertain – it is difficult to 
price such information, and with such uncertainty contracting is risky. The price 
system is often efficient in re-coordinating extant economic activity, yet “prices 
The innovation commons 1043
fail to provide information on how new markets could be served, how a new 
technology could be used to improve a production process, or how a new way or 
organizing will generate value… [prices do not] accurately guide the discovery 
and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities” (Eckhardt and Shane 2003, 
337). It is only ex post that a price may take into account the innovative value. As 
a coordinating institution, the price mechanism does not carry information that 
relieves entrepreneurial uncertainty.
The entrepreneur could also exist within an established hierarchal firm, or 
create a new start-up firm. This is where conventional innovation economics sug-
gests the innovation process, and the coordination of entrepreneurial information, 
occurs. A hierarchical firm, however, is a poor governance structure to coordinate 
highly uncertain entrepreneurial information for two reasons. First, firms have 
boundaries. It is unclear whether the complementary information required to dis-
cover a valuable opportunity is within, or outside, the boundaries of the firm. And 
second, firms carry knowledge at the level of the ‘team’ or ‘project’ or suchlike, 
and this information is not dispersed throughout the firm. Similar deficiencies 
exist with governments – namely through public science – whereby discovery is 
a directed process.
The characteristics of entrepreneurial information – and the ability of differ-
ent institutions to coordinate that information – plays no role in the market failure 
view of innovation. Further, it is only when we investigate the comparative effi-
ciency of different institutions in coordinating entrepreneurial information that 
the commons is even raised as a possibility. This is where we turn now: to the 
ability of a common property regime to coordinate and combined dispersed con-
textual information about market opportunities. 
4. Comparative properties of an innovation commons
4.1. How innovation commons are similar to other commons
An innovation commons requires a rule-governed institutional space to 
resolve the social dilemmas inherent in pooling the underlying resource. The 
common pool resource of an innovation commons is not just technology, it is 
the information that facilitates the use and application of that new technology 
to discover and create value. This information is both user relevant and 
entrepreneurially relevant. Innovation commons are thus a subset of, and similar 
to, the recent work on knowledge and cultural commons (Hess and Ostrom 2003; 
Lessig 2004; Benkler 2006; Madison et al. 2010; Frischmann et al. 2014). Both 
are contributory commons that function to create new knowledge as the common 
pool resource, rather than governing access to an already existing resource. 
Moreover, an innovation commons can be read in the various literatures on user 
innovation, democratised innovation, open innovation and collective invention 
(von Hippel 1986, 2007; Allen 1983; Chesbrough 2003; Nuvolari 2004). The 
innovation commons is part of the broader study of cooperative institutions for 
knowledge creation. 
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In contrast to other knowledge commons, however, the innovation commons 
place a greater emphasis on the assumption that the relevant knowledge is both 
distributed and latent. While much official information in an economy is central-
ised and codified, information about the use and application of a new technology 
– including its problems, costs, aspects of demand and local context – is also of 
high value. This information, however, is usually dispersed, embedded, and dif-
ficult to coordinate by hierarchical or market institutions forms. We claim that an 
innovation commons can be an efficient institutional technology to pool entrepre-
neurial information to create a valuable resource. 
Our case studies furnish preliminary evidence that innovation commons 
exhibit the same basic design rules as those first discovered by Elinor Ostrom 
and subsequently revealed to be structural features of most successfully 
functioning commons (Ostrom 1990; Dietz et al. 2003; Stern 2011; Wilson et al. 
2013). One example of an innovation commons are hackerspaces: small social 
organisations where individuals meet, work with others, and learn. Hackerspaces 
have been hubs of innovative activity, particularly around new technologies 
such as 3D printing. These spaces lack specifically designed goals, and operate 
with indeterminate and dynamic processes (Seravalli 2011). They have been 
described as intermediaries between scientific knowledge in laboratories and 
everyday problems (Kera 2012), a place of creative interaction through informal 
gathering (Moilanen 2012; Kostakis et al. 2014). Most recently, Williams and 
Hall (2015) examined a hackerspace in the context of common pool resources, 
focusing on how technology is used to manage the space and satisfy three of 
Elinor Ostrom’s design rules. One key aspect of the hackerspace movement is that 
they are developed and run by hackers, for hackers (Maxigas 2014) – that is, they 
have collectively developed rules, often based on meritocracy (Kostakis et al. 
2014). Hackerspaces are also reliant on reputation mechanisms, have been known 
to eschew the concept of money-making, and are centred around the ‘hacker 
ethic’ (Moilanen 2012). Hackerspaces seem to closely follow the design rules 
relating to distinct group boundaries, collectively developed rules and cheap-talk 
coordination, and relatively flat hierarchies. Although more extensive analysis is 
required, we can also point to a number of other innovation commons in which 
similar governance design rules are apparent: namely at the origin of new sports 
such as windsurfing (Potts and Thomas 2015); in the early stages of the wine 
industry in Australia (McIntyre et al. 2013); and the nascent blockchain industry 
collaborations, such as co-working spaces (Waters-Lynch et al. 2016). 
4.2. How innovation commons differ from other commons 
Yet the innovation commons has eight (and maybe more) features and character-
istics that distinguish it from other knowledge commons. 
 – First, the innovation commons processes uncertainty.
The basic function of an innovation commons is to pool and process distrib-
uted information in order to reduce uncertainty about the prospects and pos-
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sibilities of the novel and new technology. A new invention comes shrouded 
in uncertainty, with the extent of the uncertainty proportional to the novelty of 
the invention. In other words, the value of an innovation commons to the com-
moner’s who participate in it is directly related to the quality of the resource 
in the common pool – conditioned of course by their access to it – to reduce 
uncertainty, and to thereby facilitate confident action, such as investment, 
adoption, or forming expectations and making plans.
While the innovation commons share similar enabling factors to the 
knowledge commons – namely new forms of communication, especially social 
media, leading to falling transaction and coordination costs – they are different 
because of the ongoing presence of uncertainty. Contemporary examples 
include the enthusiast groups coalescing around 3D printing technology, 
drones, cryptocurrencies, or software. User communities associated with new 
technologies – including the growing hackerspace movement (Kostakis et al. 
2014) – are also instances of organisations surrounding pools of innovation 
resources – innovation commons (Franke and Shah 2003).
 – Second, innovation commons will tend to be ad hoc and temporary. 
This is a direct consequence of their prime function being the alleviation of 
uncertainty, such that when uncertainty dissipates, the basic rationale for the 
commons substantially weakens. Unlike natural resource commons – which 
tend to perpetuate if the rules of the commons are effective – innovation com-
mons tend to be temporary. Unless some other forces hold it together or pro-
long it – one of which we will meet in point seven below – the commons 
will tend to collapse at this point, or transform into an alternative institutional 
form (such as an industry or technology association). Note of course that the 
value of the commons continues, but the rationale for it weakens. The reason 
innovation commons will tend to collapse is due to the value of the underly-
ing common pool resource. The resource in an innovation commons is pooled 
information that resolves uncertainty, particularly over use applications, bar-
riers and costs, and market opportunities. While the innovation commons are 
born of fundamental uncertainty about innovation opportunities, addressing 
this problem successfully will collapse the functional rationale for the com-
mons. Uncertainty is what engenders their creation; and the resolution of that 
same uncertainty instigates their collapse. 
 – Third, this means that innovation commons will tend to form at the very 
earliest stage of an innovation trajectory. 
The upshot is that an innovation commons is not an economy-wide substitute 
for other innovation institutions, but a complementary institution that emerges 
at the beginning of an innovation trajectory, where uncertainty is highest. 
In the Schumpeterian model, an innovation trajectory has three phases: (1) 
entrepreneurial origination; (2) adoption and diffusion; and (3) retention and 
institutional embedding (Dosi 1982; Dopfer and Potts 2007). An innovation 
commons is thus a zero-th phase that forms before the entrepreneurial phase 
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can begin, because it gathers the information necessary for the discovery 
of the entrepreneurial opportunity from a nascent new idea or technology. 
This zero-th phase is where ill-defined and dimly perceived opportunities are 
beginning to gather and coalesce. 
Interestingly, natural resource commons also often emerge out of 
uncertainty, but this does not lead to them being temporary, but the opposite. A 
common pool resource will often be efficient where there is natural uncertainty 
about supply of the resource (such as grazing pastures, or a fishery). Private 
or public property institutions are often inefficient in such circumstances. A 
commons may thus emerge for the term of the uncertainty, which in the case of 
nature-generated uncertainty owing to weather or natural resource flows may 
be indefinite, as a perpetually more effective institution than their market and 
state alternatives. But the reason for existence of the innovation commons is 
to reduce uncertainty, and once the uncertainty passes, so does the efficiency 
case for the commons. 
 – Fourth, this prospect of uncertainty alleviation, collapse and phase transition 
into an industrial trajectory highlights that an innovation commons is not 
necessarily an institution for the social provisioning of innovation (Benkler 
2006). 
In one possible interpretation of this model, the innovation commons is an 
efficient institutional mechanism in a market-capitalist economy because 
of its particular effectiveness in dealing with high levels of uncertainty that 
can be resolved by creating a common pool resource. In this model, the 
innovation commons is an institutional mechanism to facilitate the process of 
entrepreneurial discovery (Hayek 1945; Hausmann and Rodrik 2003; Bakhshi 
et al. 2011). It is this unique property of furnishing information that reduces 
uncertainty which then enables entrepreneurs to act in other institutional 
forms – such as firms and markets, or in the state – that makes the innovation 
commons not just about social provisioning, or peer production simpliciter. 
However, the transition of the processed technology – with the innovation 
commons stripping uncertainty from it – does not necessarily result in 
subsequent adoption into a market-capitalist trajectory. What we think this 
highlights, rather, is that a modern Schumpeterian economy is still reliant on 
the commons at a fundamental, yet widely unappreciated, level.
 – Fifth, in consequence, an innovation commons will exist at many locations 
in an economy at once, with those locations continually shifting, perhaps 
frequently. 
Innovation commons are spatially and temporally mobile. An innovation 
commons will not exist across an entire economy, sector or region. Its location 
is emergent with respect to the social organisation of the development of a 
technology. These are not general spaces; much of their value comes from 
their sorting ability in whittling away uncertainty. Thus innovation commons 
exist on many scales and levels of organisation as a function of the need for 
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pooled information about the new technology by various users, adopters 
and entrepreneurs. An innovation commons is predicted to emerge along an 
innovation trajectory, within an economy, where uncertainty is highest about 
the pathways through which to develop a new idea or technology. 
 – Sixth, one of the distinct uncertainties that troubles a new technology is the 
best institutions within which to develop it. An innovation commons also 
facilitates institutional matching.
New ideas and technologies have a variety of characteristics that make them 
differentially suited to develop in different institutional forms. That is, some 
ideas may be better developed in public research institutions, for example, 
while other ideas may be better developed through the private technology 
start-ups, for example. The innovation commons provides a crucial institu-
tional component in pooling information to make those decisions. As such, 
we place no particular emphasis on the optimal institutional structure of inno-
vation ex post the discovery of an opportunity: it may be developed within a 
firm, a government, or a market. But by pooling information, an innovation 
commons potentially furnishes an efficient sorting and matching mechanism 
to increase the likelihood that a new technology subsequently develops under 
the most effective institutional environment. 
 – Seventh, one distinct prospect is that the best place to develop a technology 
is to actually keep it in the commons. The logic of this is defence against 
enclosure into alternative institutional forms.
A common property regime within a commons (as opposed to a private or a 
public good) may act defensively as institutions to minimise the risk that the 
technology will not find a viable market niche, or that it is locked on a particular 
path. Technologies and markets exhibit path dependency; the commons provides 
a mechanism to experiment with the correct path by keeping the pathway 
open. This mechanism can be observed in the efforts of those committed to 
open source software to maintain an innovation commons less as a service to 
potential entrepreneurs, but rather precisely to prevent alternative institutions 
(in this case private property rights) enclosing the technology and locking it 
into one particular path of development (Von Krogh et al. 2012). An innovation 
commons can emerge as a defensive institutional mechanism against entrenched 
economic interests. The very beginning of an industry, market, or product faces 
the prospect of political destruction by those who would see it as competition. 
An innovation commons can act as a bulwark against resistance from incumbent 
technologies and other entrenched interests with rents to protect. But, of course, 
it is also possible that these innovation commons may later form into rent-
seeking interest groups (Olson 2008). 
 – Eighth, the optimal period for an innovation commons may be relatively long, 
on the order of decades perhaps, in order to best discover or shake-out all the 
hidden and unintended consequences and costs latent within a new technology. 
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These can be devastating when discovered once private property institutions 
have attached to a technology, or once the technology is fully in the public 
domain, because of the destruction of investment, or the tendency to con-
strain a technology through global regulation. A commons serves as a space 
of ‘permissionless innovation’ (Thierer 2014). An innovation commons can 
often quickly and at relatively low cost discover unintended consequences by 
facilitating small-scale experimental adoption, often understood by pooling 
distributed information. This is less costly and less risky than a full product 
launch or mass deployment. That is, it may be an alternative institution for the 
‘trial’ stage of a technology, where the reciprocal sharing and testing between 
individuals over time may fulfil this role. 
5. Conclusion
We claim to have identified a new type of commons – an innovation commons – 
that is a subspecies of knowledge commons (Ostrom and Hess 2007; Frischmann 
et al. 2014), but with several distinct new properties, particularly that of being 
highly spatially and temporally dynamic. We suggest the innovation commons is 
in effect a third-generation type of commons, and so contributing to the literature 
on the commons; and that the institutions of the commons represent the ‘zero-th 
phase’ in the standard three phase Schumpeterian trajectory that unfolds along 
the institutions of firms, markets and governments, and so contributing to the 
literature on innovation. 
While initially commons scholars focused on natural resources (first genera-
tion) there has been a movement towards intangible common pool resources such 
as the knowledge commons (second generation). An innovation commons con-
sists of a higher order form of information and knowledge about information and 
knowledge, and is in this sense a third generation model. The pooled resource at 
the heart of an innovation commons is knowledge about the potential uses, costs, 
problems, complementary resources, and so on latent in a new technology – that 
needs to be revealed in order to overcome uncertainty inherent in discovering 
valuable opportunities. The participants in an innovation commons – from entre-
preneurs to enthusiasts – pool together contextual information about the uses of 
technology to overcome the uncertainty inherent in opportunity discovery. 
While the innovation commons are not direct competitors to other intuitional 
forms – such as firms, markets, and governments – they are often precursors to 
them because they emerge at the beginning of new technologies and industries. 
The multitude of empirical examples of organisations governing innovation com-
mons – from amateur sports clubs, hackerspaces to bitcoin co-working spaces – 
are temporary organisations because, if they are successful, instigate their own 
decline. That is, the questions that the participants seek to answer – about the 
uses, costs and possibilities of a technology – are most effectively dealt with in a 
commons, but the subsequent development of the opportunity discovered is not 
necessarily so.
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Contrary to standard innovation policy – based on market failure models of 
innovation – the innovation commons are fundamentally about collective action 
in the governance of innovation resources. A systematic study of the innovation 
commons, using updated analytical frameworks, may shed new light into both 
innovation economics and the commons literature. This extension from knowl-
edge commons to innovation commons however will not be easy, as it overlaps 
commons, entrepreneurship, and comparative institutional economics research. 
What we have provided here is a first analytical pass of defining the playing field 
of this new research domain: collaborative organisations in early stage technolo-
gies and industries. Further study of the innovation commons suggests a new 
research domain sitting between innovation economics and commons research, 
focusing specifically on the very early stages of entrepreneurial discovery and the 
emergence of new firms and industries. But this same domain of study may help 
us better understand the pathways by which a new technology may move into 
the public domain, something of particular global importance in technologies for 
healthcare, food production and sustainable energy. 
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